Cross-border transfer of electric power promotes collaboration in power generation between integrated electricity markets. It as well resolve grid reinforcement issues in existing transmission networks. Because of that, researchers have given higher attention to the field and have conducted various studies on the subject using technical simulation approaches. Yet, substantial works have to be done for quantifying the socioeconomic benefits of the mechanism. This paper intends to fill the gap by introducing a method for analyzing the mechanism by representing it as a game of incomplete information. The subject is modeled as Bayesian game in which the type of marginal generators located within one (or more) external market area is not known. Based on that, the Bayesian equilibrium which represent the state where all marginal generators would incline to converge is found. The authors suggest that the method is robust and can be used for quantifying the performance of a market coupling mechanism because it realistically consider all marginal generation scenarios.
" … In order to decide what we ought to do to obtain some good or avoid some harm, it is necessary to consider not only the good or harm in itself. But also the probability that it will or will not occur, and to view geometrically the proportions all these things have when taken together … " Payoff received by area 2: 910, area 3: 858
